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Abstract  
The agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction is very well established and widely 
employed in the metaethical literature. However, I argue that there are actually two 
different senses of the distinction at large: the hetero-/homogeneous sense and the 
dependence/independence sense. The traditional, unqualified distinction ought, 
therefore, to be amended, with each use of the distinction being stipulated as used in 
either the hetero-/homogeneous sense or the dependence/independence sense. Careful 
analysis of various metaethics supports that there are these two senses – analysis, in 
particular, of a neo-Kantian metaethic, according to which reasons are agent-relative in 
the dependence sense but agent-neutral in the homogeneous sense, and – perhaps 
surprisingly – of Utilitarianism, according to which reasons are agent-neutral in the 
independence sense but agent-relative in the heterogeneous sense. 
 
Introduction 
Minimally, a reason is a consideration in favour of some action.2 This is a normative 
definition, such that, if an agent has a reason to Φ and he/she fails to Φ, he/she has 
done something wrong – although the definition leaves open the question of whether 
this is moral wrongness or merely prudential, etc., wrongness. This very basic definition 
of a reason also leaves open the question of a reason’s defeasibility; that is, the definition 
allows that (1) if an agent has a reason to Φ as well as a reason to not-Φ, his/her reason 
to Φ may be entirely defeated by the greater reason to not-Φ, or (2) his/her reason to Φ 
may simply be trumped but not defeated by the greater reason to not-Φ. It also leaves 
open the question of (motivational) internalism/externalism; that is, the definition 
allows that (3) if an agent has a reason to Φ, his/her having a reason entails that he/she 
is at least minimally (defeasibly) motivated to Φ, or that (4) the agent may be subject to 
a reason to Φ and yet have no motivation to Φ at all. Anything more substantial than this 
is difficult to say without committing to the nature of reasons as either agent-relative or 
agent-neutral, and, the direction in which the metaethicist decides – agent-relative, or 
agent-neutral – will bring with it a host of further implications about reasons. 
 
                                                 
1 The financial assistance of the National Research Foundation (NRF) and the University of Cape Town (UCT) 
towards this research is hereby acknowledged. Opinions expressed and conclusions arrived at are those of the author 
and are not necessarily to be attributed to the NRF and/or UCT. My thanks go to Prof. Thaddeus Metz, Jesse Moore, 
Elizabeth Braae and an anonymous reviewer for their helpful suggestions as to how this paper could be improved. 
2 This definition precludes theoretical reasons. This paper deals with the agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction as 
applied – as it most commonly is – to metaethics, and thereby to practical, and not theoretical, reasons. 
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The agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction is very well established in the literature. In 
1970, Thomas Nagel drew a distinction between ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ reasons 
(Nagel 1970: p. 90). In 1984, Derek Parfit drew a distinction between ‘agent-relative’ 
and ‘agent-neutral’ ethical theories, which he identified with Nagel’s original 
subjective/objective distinction, writing: ‘Nagel’s subjective reasons are reasons only for 
the agent. I call these agent-relative […]’ (Parfit 1984: p. 143, as cited by Ridge 2005: s. 1; 
italics removed). Two years later, Nagel himself (1986) adopted the newer Parfitian 
terminology of ‘agent-relative’/‘agent-neutral’. Since then, the agent- relative/agent-
neutral distinction has pervaded the metaethical literature, establishing itself as a 
standard tool in the limited arsenal we have available to help us settle metaethical 
debates about the nature of reasons. However, as I hope to demonstrate in this paper, I 
think the agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction has outlived its usefulness. 
 
Here follows a small sample of some definitions and descriptions of the agent-
relative/agent- neutral distinction from the literature. The sample is taken from 
metaethical main-players Nagel, Parfit and Korsgaard – however, since the distinction 
is so pervasively employed in the meta- ethical literature, my aim in this paper is to 
critique the distinction itself, rather than any particular philosopher(s), so I take what 
follows merely as a sample of a more general trend in the literature.34567 
 
 
 
Definition A is taken from Nagel (1986), B from Parfit (1984), and C–E from 
Korsgaard (1993). As mentioned above, Nagel and Parfit profess to be marking out the 
same distinction. However, it’s far from obvious that definitions A and B draw the 
same distinction. Definition A seems, rather, to be saying something more like C 
than like B; and definition B seems, rather, to be saying something more like D and 
E8 than like A. However, as mentioned, my aim in this paper is not to critique either 
Nagel or Parfit in particular, but to critique instead the agent-relative/agent-neutral 
distinction itself, given  how  pervasive  the  terminology has become following its 
                                                 
3 Nagel (1986: pp. 152–153). 
4 Parfit (1984: p. 27), as cited by Ridge (2005: s.1). 
5 Korsgaard (1993: s. Introduction). 
6 Korsgaard (1993: s. I). 
7 Korsgaard (1993: s. I). 
8 That definition B is saying something (more) like E may require explanation. The nature of ‘personal property’ 
seems to preclude the possibility of you and I owning the same thing. For instance, if it’s my car, it can’t be your car. 
So you and I must have different cars. Likewise, if it’s my reason (E), it can’t be your reason. So you and I must have 
different reasons/aims (B). 
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popularisation and (I will argue) confusion. As just one example, consider how all 
three definitions C, D and E issue from the same one philosopher – yet these three 
definitions are not obviously equivalent. Compare, for instance, C’s and E’s 
definitions of the agent-relative. According to C, agent-relative reasons exist only in 
relation to individuals; and, according to E, agent-relative reasons are private 
property, possessed only by the agent. However, E’s notion of private property 
doesn’t appear to be consistent with C’s claim about existence. The notion of private 
property seems to presuppose that the possession has independent existence – 
contra C – such that it could have belonged to you, but, as it so happens, it actually 
belongs to me. Take, for instance, my car: prior to its coming to be mine, it existed 
independently in the car lot; you could have bought it, but you didn’t; instead, I bought 
it, and now it’s my private property (E). However, this certainly doesn’t mean that my 
car exists only in relation to me (C). Thus, even though they go by the same names of 
‘agent- relative’/ʻagent-neutral’, there appear to be various different definitions of 
this distinction at large in the literature. 
 
I wish to argue that there are (at least9) two distinct senses of ‘agent-relative’/ʻagent-
neutral’ portrayed in this sample, with A and C drawing one kind of distinction, and B, D 
and E another. I go on to defend the claim that there are these two senses of the 
distinction against the objection that there is, in fact, just one distinction and that the 
apparent differences in definitions are only superficial – that is, the ‘reduction objection’. 
I mount my defence against the reduction objection by appealing to a variety of 
‘combination cases’. A combination case is a seriously plausible metaethic according to 
which a reason is agent-relative in one sense but agent-neutral in another. Given that the 
traditional, unqualified distinction obscures these combination cases, which are 
seriously plausible metaethics, my contention is that either, modestly, we ought to 
qualify each future use of the terminology by stipulating the sense in which it is being 
employed or, more aggressively, the traditional terminology ought to be abandoned 
entirely, in favour of a vocabulary less confusing. These two senses of the agent-
relative/agent-neutral distinction are discussed below. 
 
The two senses 
The hetero-/homogeneous sense 
Call the first sense of the traditional agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction the 
hetero-/ homogeneous sense of the distinction. Take definition B, above, as the 
standard definition of the agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction on this hetero-
/homogeneous sense. According to this sense of the distinction, reasons are agent-relative 
when they differ from person to person. For instance, if I have a reason to go on a diet, but 
you don’t have a reason to go on a diet, then that reason, which holds differentially across 
you and me, must be an agent-relative reason in the heterogeneous sense. On the other 
                                                 
9 There may well be further variant interpretations of the traditional terminology than the two I go on to describe. Prof. 
Thaddeus Metz has suggested, for instance, that ‘agent-relative’/‘agent-neutral’ might also be used to indicate the 
weakness/strength or defeasibility/primacy of a reason, and I hint at a further alternative interpretation in fn.24. 
Unfortunately however, I am unable to explore fully this possibility here. However, of course, the more distinct senses 
of the traditional distinction there are, the stronger my argument against it. 
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hand, reasons are agent-neutral in this hetero-/homogeneous sense of the distinction 
when they do not differ from person to person but hold uniformly across persons. For 
instance, you might think that everybody has a reason to floss daily. Of course, hardly 
anybody actually does floss daily, but you might think that, insofar as daily flossing is 
crucial to dental hygiene, which is crucial to one’s health, everybody has a reason to 
floss daily, and this reason holds uniformly across persons. Moral reasons are also a 
popular candidate here:10 you might think that everybody, no matter who you are – the 
richest of the richest or the poorest of the poor – has a reason to, say, help others when 
it’s at very little cost to themselves. If there’s a child drowning in the pool, and you can 
swim, it doesn’t matter if you’re the president of the universe or just the milkman: you 
have a reason to jump into that pool and save the drowning child. Reasons such as this, 
that hold uniformly across persons, are homogeneously agent-neutral; they’re agent-
neutral in the sense that they apply neutrally across all persons, not ‘favouring’ some over 
others. 
 
A primary example in ethics of the agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction in this 
hetero-/ homogeneous sense would be the contrast between Egoism and Deontology. 
Egoism is straightforwardly heterogeneously agent-relative in that it gives different 
egoistic reasons to difference egos, or agents. Deontology, on the other hand, is 
homogeneously agent-neutral in that its reasons are categorical, applying across all 
agents, in all circumstances, absolutely. 
 
The dependence/independence sense 
Call the second sense of the distinction the dependence/independence sense. According to 
this sense, reasons are agent-relative when they are dependent on the agent in some sense, 
when the relationship of reason to reason-holder is essential to the reason’s being. On the 
other side of the divide, reasons are agent-neutral in this sense when the relationship of 
reason to reason-holder is merely contingent, when the reason could exist independently of 
the subject to whom it applies. Whereas homogeneously agent-neutral reasons (above) apply 
uniformly to everybody and are neutral amongst agents, independently agent-neutral 
reasons are neutral of agents. Unlike the former hetero-/homogeneous sense, this 
dependence/independence sense is a metaphysical take on the distinction. 
 
A perceptual analogy will help to see the difference between the agent-relative and 
the A perceptual analogy will help to see the difference between the agent-relative 
and the agent-neutral in this dependence/independence sense. Consider an object – 
say, this pen. This pen has mind-independent existence. If I close my eyes, or turn 
around, or leave the room, the pen will still be there. If I drop dead, the pen will go on 
existing, for a time. However, consider now your perceptual impression of the pen 
itself. This perceptual impression, unlike the pen itself, is mind-dependent: if I 
dropped dead and stopped existing my perceptual impression of the pen would also 
stop existing, even though the pen itself would go on. On the dependence/ 
                                                 
10 Indeed, as definition B suggests, Parfi t (1984) apparently identifies the (homogeneously) agent-neutral with the 
moral. 
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independence sense  of  the  distinction,  agent-relative  reasons  are  dependent  on  
the  agent in a similar sense to that in which perceptual impression is dependent on 
the subject: without the subject/agent there are no such things. Agent-neutral 
reasons, on the other hand, on this dependence/independence sense, are more like 
objects than the perceptual impressions of objects; they exist independently, 
regardless of whether we have a perspective on them or not. Take definition A, above, 
as the standard definition of the agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction on this 
dependence/independence sense. This follows because, if – as it is on the dependence/ 
independence sense – an agent-relative reason is dependent on the agent, then that 
reason cannot be formulated, as definition A goes, without essential reference to the 
agent. And if – as it is according to the dependence/independence sense – an agent-
neutral reason obtains independently of the agent, then it can be formulated without 
essential reference to the agent. 
 
A primary example of the agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction in the 
dependence/independence sense is the metaethical contrast between Constructivism 
and Realism. According to the Constructivist, normativity is imposed upon the world 
by agents, and there would be no value in the world if we humans did not deem some 
things valuable. According to one foremost Constructivist account (Korsgaard 1996), 
an agent has a reason when he/she identifies him-/ herself in a particular way – say, 
as a violinist. Being a violinist gives such an agent a reason to practise playing the violin. 
This is dependence agent-relativity, because the counterfactual holds that, had the agent 
not identified him-/herself in that way, he/she would not have had such a reason – 
indeed, there wouldn’t have been any such reason to be had at all. Had the agent not 
identified himself as a violinist, he would not have had a reason to practise playing the 
violin. On the other hand, according to Realism, normativity is not created by the agent, 
but is discovered, and there would be (would continue to be) value in the world if we 
humans were no longer around to recognise it. This is independence agent-neutrality, 
because the counterfactual does not hold that, had the agent not recognised the reason to 
Φ, he/she would not have had such a reason; rather, on this independently agent-neutral, 
Realist account, if the agent fails to recognise his/her reason to Φ, then the agent is 
simply mistaken. 
 
The argument 
So, because there are these two senses of the distinction – hetero-/homogeneous and 
dependence/ independence – and because these senses are entirely separate and 
distinct, but are nevertheless picked out by the self-same terminology of ‘agent-
relative’ and ‘agent-neutral’, there is large scope for serious confusion. 11  The 
traditional, unqualified terminology ought therefore to be amended. 
 
                                                 
11 That there are two separate definitions demarcated by the self-same terminology is, I think, sufficient to motivate the 
claim that there is large scope for serious confusion (and that, therefore, amendments ought to be made). However, my 
claim that the terminology is confusing does receive further support in later sections of the paper, in particular where, 
by way of application to Utilitarianism, I explore just how difficult it is to apply these labels of ‘agent-relative’ and  
‘agentneutral’ even after we have distinguished between the two senses thereof. 
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The reduction objection 
However, you might complain, what I have described as two separate and distinct 
senses of the agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction are really not that separate and 
distinct. Instead, you might suggest, definitions A and B are really talking about the same 
thing – just with B one step further removed than A, so to speak. That is, you might think 
that the hetero-/homogeneous sense in fact reduces to the dependence/independence 
sense. Here’s how: if reasons are independently agent-neutral – that is, if they exist 
independently of our taking a view of/on them, like, say, this pen – neutral – that is, if 
they exist independently of our taking a view of/on them, like, say, this pen – then it 
follows that they will be agent-neutral in the homogeneous sense too. This pen is this 
pen is this pen, independently of what any of us think of it, so the pen’s existence goes 
for all of us – that is, it is homogeneously agent-neutral. The independent agent-
neutrality of the pen entails its homogeneous agent-neutrality. What applies in the case 
of pens applies in the case of reasons: if reasons are independently agent-neutral, then 
their existence goes for all of us, and they are thus homogeneously agent-neutral too. 
The independent agent-neutrality of reasons entails their homogeneous agent-neutrality. 
 
If, on the other hand, reasons are dependently agent-relative – that is, if they are more 
like a perception of a pen than the pen itself – then it follows that they are 
heterogeneously agent-relative too. Consider how our perceptions of this pen are all 
slightly different: I see it from this angle, you see it from that angle; you see it head-on, 
another sees it length-ways. So, if reasons are agent-relative in the dependence sense, 
like perceptual impressions, then, as each person has a different perceptual impression, 
each person will have a different reason, and dependently agent-relative reasons are 
thus agent-relative in the heterogeneous sense too. 
 
So, agent-relativity in the dependence sense entails agent-relativity in the heterogeneous 
sense, and agent-neutrality in the independence sense entails agent-neutrality in the 
homogeneous sense. And, the objection goes, the hetero-/homogeneous sense of the 
distinction is really just a derivative sense of the dependence/independence sense. At the 
end of the day, my two senses reduce to the same distinction, and I have no grounds for 
complaint. 
 
Response 
However, this objection depends on a misunderstanding of dependence agent-relativity 
and/or a lack of creativity. In response to the reduction objection, I argue that the 
hetero-/homogeneous sense of the distinction cannot simply be reduced to the 
dependence/independence sense, due to what I call ‘combination cases’, that is, cases 
of seriously plausible metaethics that are agent-relative in one sense yet agent-neutral 
in another. There are two kinds of combination cases available: metaethics according 
to which reasons are dependently agent-relative and nevertheless homogeneously 
agent-neutral, on the one hand, and metaethics according to which reasons are 
independently agent-neutral but nevertheless heterogeneously agent-relative. Of 
course, the more combination cases I can provide, the greater the ammunition for my 
critique of the traditional agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction. I think the former 
http://repository.uwc.ac.za
 7 
 
kind of combination case is easily achieved, as soon as dependence agent-relativity is 
correctly understood. The latter kind of combination case, however, is not as 
straightforward, and to that end I examine three candidate cases below. 
 
Combination case 1: dependence agent-relativity with homogeneous agent-
neutrality 
Contrary to the reduction objection, dependence agent-relativity doesn’t actually entail 
heterogeneous agent-relativity, and we were misled into thinking that it does by a false 
analogy of dependence agent-relativity with perceptual impression. Agent-relativity in the 
dependence sense is not like perception – if this means: perception of a thing that has 
independent existence. The point of dependence agent-relativity is that, unlike 
independent agent-neutrality, there’s nothing more to reasons beyond the agent’s 
relationship to them. This is unlike perception, which (as opposed to hallucination) is 
always of something independent. For instance, consider Constructivism as a dependently 
agent-relative metaethic.12 On this account the agent gives him-/herself reasons by way 
of his/her identification, e.g. an agent has reason to practise playing violin because he 
identifies himself as a violinist. This is not to say – as the pen analogy might have 
suggested – that the agent’s identifying himself as a violinist (and thereby giving himself 
reason to practise playing violin) is a response to the perceived, independently-existing 
value of violin-playing – because, plausibly, violin-playing has no such independently-
existing value. Rather, says Constructivism, violin-playing is valuable because the agent 
values it (only); we give it value, as we give ourselves reasons. Dependently agent-
relative reasons are not perceptions of independently-existing value; perceptual 
impressions agent-relative reasons are not perceptions of independently-existing value; 
perceptual impressions of pens, on the other hand, are perceptions of independently-
existing pens, and that is why the dependence agent-relativity of perceptual impression 
would seem to entail its heterogeneous agent-relativity: because we all occupy a different 
perspective on the independently-existing pen. 
 
The pen analogy was originally employed to illustrate, by analogy with perception, 
the mind-dependent nature of agent-relativity (in the dependence sense) only. The pen 
analogy is a nice one, because it allows one to draw an easy comparison between the 
mind-dependent perception and the mind-independent object of perception, as we 
indeed did, above; but it’s also misleading for this very reason. Mind-dependence is a 
feature of all mental states, which include – but are not limited to – perceptual 
impression, so we may well have used any other mental state besides perceptual 
impression to illustrate the mind-dependence of agent-relative reasons (in the 
dependence sense). So, rather than perceptual impressions, dependently agent-relative 
reasons might be more like, say, decisions: they’re mind-dependent (as are all mental 
states, including decisions), but they’re not responsive to the world in the tight kind of 
way that perceptual impressions are. Unlike perceptual impression, where we’re all 
taking a (slightly) different perspective on an independently existing object, there’s 
                                                 
12 I gave a brief description of Constructivism at the end of the section titled ‘The dependence/independence sense’, 
above. 
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nothing in the nature of a decision that rules out the possibility of two people reaching 
the same decision; indeed, it’s a common- place occurrence. Two people’s reaching the 
same decision is possible even if those two people occupy radically different 
perspectives; 13  for instance, a middle-class, 30-something, stay-at- home mother 
might find the time to pursue her dream and finally decide to take up the violin, just as 
a 16-year-old, musically gifted pianist might want to increase his repertoire and decide 
to take up the violin. So, although it seems that, in the case of perceptual impression, 
dependence agent-relativity entails heterogeneous agent-relativity, the entailment need 
not hold in the case of a different mental state, like making a decision. There don’t 
appear to be grounds for thinking that dependence agent-relativity entails 
heterogeneous agent-relativity when it comes to decisions. If dependently agent-
relative reasons are, then, more like decisions and less like perceptual impressions, 
there is room for a metaethic according to which reasons are dependently agent-
relative but nevertheless homogeneously agent-neutral. 
 
However, is the mere possibility of dependently agent-relative, homogeneously agent-
neutral reasons sufficient to support my argument? If I want to make the bold claim, 
as I do, that the traditional ‘agent-relative’/‘agent-neutral’ terminology ought to be 
amended, then the combination case I wish to accommodate by that amendment must at 
least be a seriously plausible metaethic.14 However, you may think, the combination 
case I’ve described above isn’t plausible at all. In particular, you may think that it’s 
highly unlikely that dependently agent-relative reasons would ever turn out to be 
homogeneously agent-neutral if they are less like perceptual impressions and more like 
decisions. (How often do different people reach the same decisions – such as taking up 
the violin, for instance – anyway?) Indeed, it seems that if dependently agent-relative 
reasons are, as I have urged, less like perceptions and more like decisions, then the 
chances that we would all have the same dependently agent-relative reasons would 
decrease dramatically. Why? Consider why we might expect people to share largely the 
same mind-dependent states. Take, again, the case of perceptual impression, for 
instance. We’d expect people to (largely) share the same perceptual impression when 
there is something out there that causes that perceptual impression; the pen, for 
instance. That is, large-scale homogeneity, if it is to be statistically likely and more than 
pure fluke, requires some kind of causal connection, some common cause that therefore 
explains the homogeneous effects. In the perceptual example, this role is served by the 
                                                 
13 Objectors may complain that this is an illegitimate, equivocational use of ‘perspective’ in that it means something 
like a person’s demographic here, whereas the previous use of the term meant something quite different: a person’s 
direction of gaze, given their position in space. Objectors would be right to point out this difference. However, I deny 
that it is illegitimate: the point of my response is that dependently agent-relative reasons are not as closely analogous 
to perceptual impressions as the reduction objection supposes (and, by way of the new analogy proposed in its stead, 
that decisions are not closely analogous to perceptual impression either), and that therefore we shouldn’t expect to see 
a neat corollary of perceptual-perspective in the realm of decisions. Whether or not the illustration I go on to provide is 
a legitimate case of like decisions produced by divergent perspectives, I think the point stands that there is nothing in 
the nature of decision that entails that different deciders must necessarily reach different decisions, where there 
apparently is in the case of perception. 
14 Bear in mind that ‘seriously plausible’ needn’t mean correct. Insofar as the agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction is 
supposed to help settle metaethical debates (only), the combination cases I propose in favour of the amendment of that 
traditional distinction needn’t be correct; they just need to be decent enough candidates. 
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pen. However, if dependently agent-relative reasons are less like perceptions and more 
like, say, decisions, when – as I put it above – the point of dependence agent-relativity is 
that there’s nothing more to reasons beyond the agent’s relationship to them, then any 
possible connection between the homogeneous mind-dependent states and their 
common cause is severed. Without anything independent to explain the homogeneous 
effects, it seems very unlikely indeed that we’d all end up with the same mind-dependent 
states. So, if reasons are dependently agent-relative, it’s strikingly unlikely that they 
could be homogeneously agent-neutral. Therefore, the objection goes, we still have no 
serious cause to amend the traditional, very well established vocabulary of the ‘agent-
relative’/‘agent- neutral’, since the first proposed combination case really isn’t seriously 
plausible. 
 
However, this is short-sighted. I will grant to the objector that only a seriously 
plausibly metaethic could give us cause to amend the traditional agent-relative/agent-
neutral distinction, and that a metaethic, the conditions of which are statistically 
unlikely to obtain, is not seriously plausible. I will even grant that homogeneity is 
unlikely to obtain when there is no common cause that would explain the 
homogeneity. However, what I dispute is that this common cause must be independent 
of the agent – something like a pen, for instance, out there in the world. Instead, I 
contend that there is something common amongst us, some shared feature that would 
increase the likelihood that we all end up having the same dependently agent-relative 
reasons. However, that shared feature isn’t independent of us, it isn’t out there in the 
world; rather, it is just this: the fact that we are all agents. It strikes me as quite 
plausible that there could be something about us, some feature of being human – not 
something in the world apart from us – that makes it quite likely, perhaps even 
necessitates, that we would all make the same decisions on some matters, even given 
the large variation of personality, age, culture, perspective, etc., amongst us. Indeed, I 
think this gets to the heart of Kantian metaethics. A metaethic that were, à la Kant, to 
posit dependently agent-relative reasons grounded not in the world but in our nature as 
agents, in our humanity, would have good cause to expect that those dependently 
agent- relative reasons would nevertheless turn out to be homogeneously agent-
neutral, given that common cause that is our human nature. 
 
So, there is at least one seriously plausible metaethic according to which reasons are 
dependently agent-relative, more like decisions than like perceptions, but which would 
nevertheless turn out to be homogeneously agent-neutral, given the way they are 
grounded in human nature, which is common to all of us. This neo-Kantian combination 
of the dependently agent-relative with the homogeneously agent-neutral gives us good 
cause to amend the traditional, unqualified distinction.15 
 
 
                                                 
15 See Korsgaard (1993) for an account of this kind of neo-Kantian combination case, and for a critique of the 
traditional agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction similar to the one I have offered in this section. 
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Combination case(s) 2: independence agent-neutrality with heterogeneous 
agent-relativity 
It may be possible to secure a second nail in the coffin for the traditional agent-
relative/agent- neutral distinction by demonstrating a second kind of combination case. 
Whereas, above, it was argued that a certain kind of neo-Kantian metaethic can hold 
reasons to be dependently agent- relative but nevertheless homogeneously agent-
neutral, this second combination case must be one according to which reasons are 
independently agent-neutral but nevertheless heterogeneously agent-relative. To this 
end, I examine below, three candidates for this second kind of combi- nation case: a 
modified version of Divine Command Theory, a modified version of Realism, and 
Utilitarianism. 
 
Divine Command, to some but not to others, Theory 
Imagine God tells some people, say, the Jews, not to eat certain things, but has nothing 
to say to the rest of the population on this score. As a result, some people have a reason 
to abstain from the rest of the population on this score. As a result, some people have a 
reason to abstain from certain foods, but others do not. That is, we have heterogeneous 
agent-relativity. Furthermore, since the reason came not from the agents but from God, 
we have independent agent-neutrality.16 
 
Since many people do indeed believe that God commanded the Jews to behave in ways 
he didn’t command the Gentiles to, I take this to be a seriously plausible metaethic. 
Thus, this case of the independently agent-neutral in conjunction with the 
heterogeneously agent-relative looks like a second case against the traditional, 
unqualified agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction. 
 
However, I’m afraid, I think this is wrong. It is correct that a command given by God to 
some and not others would be heterogeneously agent-relative, but I do not think it 
correct that such a command would be independently agent-neutral. This is because 
such a reason would not issue from God per se but from God’s commanding. While God 
per se is independently agent-neutral, God’s commanding is not. This is because 
commanding, like any speech act, is a second-personal affair, as Stephen Darwall (2006) 
has pointed out. Commanding presupposes a listener as well as a speaker; there can be no 
such thing as a command unless there is, conceivably at least, someone to be commanded. 
So, says Darwall, a second-personal reason – like the reason issued by a command – is 
not (independently) agent-neutral but is, rather, (dependently) agent-relative (2006: p. 
8).17 Unlike God per se, God’s commanding would depend as much on the Jews as it 
would on God himself, and is therefore a dependently agent-relative matter, rather than 
an independently agent- neutral one, as we originally supposed. So, God’s commanding 
the Jews but not the Gentiles to abstain from certain foods would constitute not an 
independently agent-neutral but nevertheless heterogeneously agent-relative reason, as 
                                                 
16 Thanks to Prof. Thaddeus Metz for this suggestion. 
17 Note that Darwall (2006) does not distinguish between the two senses of the traditional agent-relative/agent-neutral 
distinction as I have. However, that he gives ‘agent-neutral’ reasons the alternative title of ‘state-of-world-regarding’ 
reasons (p. 6) I think makes quite clear that he has in mind the dependence/independence sense of the distinction. 
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suggested above, but rather just a dependently agent- relative and heterogeneously 
agent-relative reason. Despite initial appearances, this version of Divine Command 
Theory does not constitute a combination case. 
 
Conditional Realism 
Since a version of Constructivism (namely, neo-Kantianism) afforded us the first 
combination case, according to which reasons are dependently agent-relative yet 
homogeneously agent-neutral, perhaps Realism – which I earlier contrasted with 
Constructivism – will afford us the second combination case, according to which 
reasons are independently agent-neutral yet heterogeneously agent-relative. 
 
According to Realism, normativity is not created but discovered, and there would be 
(would continue to be) value18 in the world if we humans were no longer around to 
recognise it. Realism is therefore an agent-neutral metaethic in the independence sense. 
But how can this be consistent with heterogeneous agent-relativity? Above, I argued 
that ‘This pen is this pen is this pen, independently of what any of us think of it, so the 
pen’s existence goes for all of us’; that is, the pen’s independence agent-neutrality entails 
its homogeneous agent-neutrality. However, even if reasons are mind-independently 
real things, like pens, they needn’t be real in the same sense as pens are real. Of course, 
reasons aren’t physically real, as pens are. However, they may be real in a different kind 
of way. Rather, claim Realists, reasons are sui generis entities, independently agent- 
neutral, like pens, yet non-physical and normative, unlike pens. It is the Realist sui 
generis nature of reasons that opens the door for heterogeneous agent-relativity. 
 
I have in mind the proposal that, if reasons are sui generis entities, these sui generis 
entities may have a conditional form. (If they’re non-physical entities, what’s 
stopping them from having a conditional form?) That is, they may have the form ‘If you 
are such-and-such or are in such-and-such a position, then you ought to…’. I think it’s 
quite plausible that reasons do have this conditional form. Consider an example from 
earlier: if there is a child drowning nearby, and if you conditional form. Consider an 
example from earlier: if there is a child drowning nearby, and if you can swim, then you 
have a reason to help save that child. That means that: if there isn’t a drowning child, or if 
the drowning child isn’t nearby, or if you can’t swim (or all of the above), then you don’t 
have a reason to try to save the child – even when, if there was a drowning child and she 
was nearby, somebody who could swim would have a reason to try to save the child. 
That is, reasons of this conditional form would be heterogeneously agent-relative, 
applying to those who fulfil the antecedent of the conditional but not to those who don’t. 
Thus, we would have a metaethic that is independently agent-neutral, being a version of 
Realism, yet simultaneously heterogeneously agent-relative, given the conditional nature 
of the sui generis real entities. That is, we would have a second combination case against 
the traditional agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction. 
                                                 
18 Strictly speaking, this claim ought to be restricted to ‘moral value’. (The same goes for my mention of ‘reasons’ in 
this present section.) However, I have not made much of the moral/non-moral distinction in this paper. If a 
combination case can be established just with respect to moral reasons (but not with respect to non-moral reasons), 
that is sufficient for my argument. 
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However, is Conditional Realism a seriously plausible metaethic? As far as I am aware, 
no philosopher has yet defended a metaethic like it.19 To this extent, it doesn’t look as if 
Conditional Realism is seriously plausible. Traditional Realism, however, certainly is a 
seriously plausible and popular metaethic – and Conditional Realism does not strike me 
as too great an adaptation of traditional Realism. Furthermore, I would go so far as to 
claim that perhaps no philosopher has yet defended a metaethic such as Conditional 
Realism because the traditional, unqualified vocabulary has obscured its possibility. 
However, even if the reader is not prepared to accept an as-yet undefended metaethic 
as a seriously plausible combination case against the traditional distinction, according 
to which reasons are independently agent-neutral but nevertheless heterogeneously 
agent-relative, the following combination case will satisfy. 
 
Utilitarianism 
Utilitarianism is the flagship agent-neutral ethical theory. Any undergraduate Ethics 
student can tell you that Utilitarianism is agent-neutral. However, in what sense? It must 
be, it seems: agent-neutral in the sense that it doesn’t matter whose utility is maximised by 
an action – your wife’s, or the other drowning person’s, for instance. As I described 
homogeneous agent-neutrality, above: ‘it doesn’t matter if you’re the president of the 
universe or just the milkman’.20 Therefore, Utilitarianism must be agent-neutral in the 
homogeneous sense. 
 
However, this would be a mistake. The rest of my description of homogeneous agent-
neutrality was: ‘it doesn’t matter if you’re the president of the universe or just the 
milkman: you have a reason to jump into that pool and save the drowning child’ 
(emphasis added). 21  That is, ‘it doesn’t matter’ who the person is, as far as 
homogeneous agent-neutrality is concerned, when we’re talking about the identity of 
the agent, the person who has the reason. (This is because, if reasons are homogeneously 
agent-neutral, all agents will be subject to the same reasons. So it doesn’t matter who 
you are.) However, this is quite different to the present Utilitarian case. In this case, 
when we say that ‘it doesn’t matter’ whether the drowning person is your wife or a 
stranger, we’re talking about the identity of the beneficiary, the one to whom the action 
will be done – not the agent, the one who will act. This is a slippery point, but I think it’s 
crucial. That it doesn’t matter whose utility is maximised by an action is not what makes 
Utilitarianism agent-neutral. 
 
This is not to say, however, that I disagree with thousands of Ethics undergraduates 
and the metaethical canon that Utilitarianism is agent-neutral. However, I argue, 
Utilitarianism is agent- neutral in the independence sense. However, if Utilitarianism is 
the thesis that we ought to maximise happiness – and happiness is surely mind-dependent 
– how could Utilitarianism be independently agent-neutral? I have a few points in 
response to this reaction. First, recall that Utilitarianism, generally speaking, is not 
                                                 
19 Ronald N. Giere (2010), however, has defended a position called ‘Conditional Realism’ in the philosophy of 
science. However, this is apparently unrelated to the metaethical position I have in mind. 
20 This is from the section titled ‘The hetero-/homogeneous sense’. 
21 This is from the section titled ‘The hetero-/homogeneous sense’. 
http://repository.uwc.ac.za
 13 
 
committed to the identification of utility with happiness in particular. Second, consider 
how Utilitarian reasoning is employed with regard to animals (e.g. Bentham and Second, 
consider how Utilitarian reasoning is employed with regard to animals (e.g. Bentham22 
and Singer23) or to future persons (e.g. Benatar24). Given that such beneficiaries aren’t 
agents, the utility appealed to can’t be dependently agent-relative, and so must be 
independently agent-neutral. Last, recall that Utilitarianism locates normativity not in 
utility per se but in the maximisation thereof. The Utilitarian principle calls us to 
‘maximise expected utility’, or, as it might otherwise be phrased, ‘act so as to produce the 
greatest net utility or least net disutility’. Of course, an action that produces the least net 
disutility may actually produce some utility. If Utilitarianism located normativity in utility 
per se, such an action that produced a net disutility (some utility, but more disutility) would 
be partly good. However, this isn’t the case. Utilitarianism locates normativity not in utility 
per se but rather in the maximisation thereof, such that an action that produces a net 
disutility is morally bad, even if that action produces some utility. Note that maximisation 
doesn’t appear to be a mind-dependent matter. Maximisation is, rather, an objective fact, 
a state of the world (even if it is a state of the world-as-containing-minds-that-
experience-utility and those objective facts are objective psycho- logical facts). 25  
Utilitarians, I think, conceive of utility as something like, say, oxygen: oxygen can be in 
your lungs or in my lungs, but there is an objective matter of fact as to what 
atmospheric oxygen levels are (and we want those levels to be higher rather than lower). 
Seeing, on this analogy, how the Utilitarian thinks about utility can also give us insight 
into why it is, on the Utilitarian account, that ‘it doesn’t matter’ whether it’s your wife or 
the other drowning person whose utility is maximised: utility is just utility, as oxygen is just 
oxygen, even though sometimes a bit of it is in you and sometimes a bit of it is in me, or in 
your wife or in the other drowning person. Thus, the way in which utility and its 
maximisation is understood is as independently agent-neutral. This holds even if utility is 
identified with happiness. 
 
Furthermore, I wish to argue that the sense in which Utilitarianism is agent-neutral is 
not the homogeneous sense (as we first considered) because Utilitarianism – if it is a 
seriously plausible metaethic – is actually heterogeneously agent-relative. If this is 
correct, and if my argument that Utilitarianism is independently agent-neutral (above) 
is correct, then Utilitarianism constitutes a combination case against the traditional 
distinction, a metaethic according to which reasons are independently agent-neutral but 
simultaneously heterogeneously agent-relative. 26  Why think that Utilitarianism is 
                                                 
22 See The Principles of Morals and Legislation (1948). 
23 See Animal Liberation (1975). 
24 See Better Never to Have Been (2008). Thanks to Anna Hartford for helping me with this point. 
25 Thanks for Prof. Thaddeus Metz for help with this point 
26 Readers unsatisfied with my argument (above) that Utilitarianism is agent-neutral in the independence sense may 
wish to retain the initial impression that Utilitarianism is agent-neutral in the sense that it doesn’t matter whose utility 
is maximized – your wife’s, or the other drowning person’s. I have shown, above, that this ‘it doesn’t matter whose’ is 
not homogeneous agent-neutrality – so my critic may wish to argue, instead, that this demonstrates that there is a 
further, third sense of the agent-neutral. (Perhaps call it the love/beneficence sense of the distinction, following Harry 
Frankfurt’s (2004) claim that love is ‘ineluctably personal’ in that the object of one’s love cannot be substituted (p. 79) 
– that is, agent-relativity in this sense – whereas, when it comes to mere beneficence (Frankfurt gives the example of a 
charity worker), ‘any sick or poor person will do’ (p. 43) – that is, agent-neutrality in this sense.) I am quite 
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heterogeneously agent-relative? To see why, consider what things would look like if 
Utilitarianism were not heterogeneously agent-relative but homogeneously agent-
neutral. Say, for instance, the action of saving a drowning child in Papua New Guinea is 
the action that, now, would produce the greatest net utility – greater than any other 
action I could now perform in South Africa. (We can imagine that the child is perhaps 
some sort of prodigy – say, a medical genius, who is on the brink of developing a cure for 
AIDS, that this child has captured the world’s heart and that millions of people would be 
devastated by her death, etc.) According to Utilitarianism, then, I have a reason to try to 
save the drowning child in Papua New Guinea (as does anyone and everyone, if 
Utilitarianism is homogeneously agent-neutral). However, this isn’t intuitively plausible. 
First, I’m not in Papua New Guinea; I’m here, on the other side of the world. So I’d have 
to get myself to Papua New Guinea. However, by the time I got to Papua New Guinea, 
some other agent, who – if Utilitarianism is homogeneously agent-neutral – would also 
have a reason to try save the drowning child, and who is a resident of Papua New Guinea, 
would probably already have saved the child. Thus, on this homogeneously agent-neutral 
account of Utilitarianism, I would have been morally obliged to fly myself to Papua New 
Guinea, since that was a means to the end of producing the greatest net utility, but the 
chances of this morally required action actually producing the greatest net utility – or 
any utility at all – are really quite small. Intuitively, I don’t have an obligation to try to 
save the drowning child in Papua New Guinea, since it’s highly unlikely that I could do 
anything to help her. However, those agents who are residents of Papua New Guinea, and 
who are in the vicinity of the drowning child, intuitively do have a reason to try to save her, 
since it is likely (or, at least, more likely than it is in my case) that their actions will be 
successful and will indeed maximise utility. If, intuitively, some agents will have a reason 
to try to save the drowning child, but others will not, this is an appeal to heterogeneous 
agent-relativity. 
 
Indeed, one way to read the qualification of the Utilitarian principle that we ought to 
‘maximise expected utility’ might be as an attempt to capture this heterogeneous 
agent-relativity. The ‘expected’ qualification, cashed out, is this: you have a reason to 
act so as to maximise utility when you could reasonably expect that that action will 
indeed maximise utility.27 Thus, conversely, when you can’t reasonably expect that your 
action will indeed maximise utility, you don’t have a reason to so act. When, for instance, 
it is highly unlikely that my trying to save the drowning child in Papua New Guinea will 
                                                                                                                                                                
sympathetic to this. It would constitute a critique of my characterisation of Utilitarianism – but it would nevertheless 
constitute a combination case to challenge the traditional agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction, in that Utilitarianism 
would be agent-neutral (in the beneficence sense) yet agent-relative (in the heterogeneous sense, as I go on to argue). 
27 I say in the opening sentence of this paragraph that this is ‘one way’ to understand the ‘expected’ qualification, since 
I think that the standard way of reading it is different to the reading I present above. The standard reading of this 
qualification, cashed out, focuses on the ‘could reasonably expect’ component, such that the converse of it is: when 
unusual, idiopathic preferences mean that Φing will produce a very large amount of utility – but you could not have 
known that Φing would have had that consequence – then you did not have a reason to Φ, and you are not 
blameworthy for not Φing. That is, the standard reading of the ‘expected’ qualification is an epistemological one: you 
don’t have a reason when you couldn’t have known the consequences. The reading I offer here, however, is a practical 
reading. It focuses on the ‘will indeed maximise utility’ component, such that the converse is: you don’t have a reason 
to Φ when your Φing won’t actually produce the desired consequences. These two readings, the epistemological and 
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indeed be successful and will maximise utility, I don’t have a reason to try to save her. 
However, when, on the other hand, we can reasonably expect that the action of a 
resident of Papua New Guinea will be successful and will maximise utility, then that 
agent does have a reason to try to save the drowning child. Heterogeneous agent-
relativity, it seems, is built into the Utilitarian principle that we ought to maximise 
expected utility.28 
 
I do not think that any of this discussion constitutes a significant variation on 
traditional Utilitarianism – unlike Conditional Realism with regard to traditional 
Realism – so, as such, I do not think the question of Utilitarianism’s being a seriously 
plausible metaethic needs to be addressed. Its popularity proves as much. I therefore 
conclude that Utilitarianism, well-known as it is for being ‘agent-neutral’, is agent-neutral 
only in the independence sense, yet is simultaneously agent-relative in the 
heterogeneous sense, and therefore constitutes a further combination case against the 
traditional agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction. 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, I have delineated two senses of the widely used agent-relative/agent-
neutral distinction: the hetero-/homogeneous sense (according to which agent-
relative reasons differ from person to person, and agent-neutral reasons obtain 
uniformly across persons) and the dependence/independence sense (according to 
which agent-relative reasons depend essentially on the agent, whereas agent-neutral 
reasons do not). I have defended my claim against the objection that the hetero-
/homogeneous sense ultimately bottoms out as the dependence/independence sense 
by demonstrating that we can have combinations of agent-relativity in the one sense 
with agent-neutrality in the other. The first combination case against the traditional 
distinction was that of a neo-Kantian metaethic, according to which reasons are agent-
relative in the depend- ence sense, but turn out to be agent-neutral in the homogeneous 
sense, grounded as they are in our humanity, which is necessarily a common feature of all 
of us. A further combination case against the traditional distinction – a case of 
independently agent-neutral reasons which are nevertheless heterogeneously agent-
relative – was found in Utilitarianism, where I argued that Utilitarians conceive of utility 
                                                                                                                                                                
the practical, are nevertheless consistent with each other. I suggest that Utilitarians have in mind both with their 
qualification that we ought to act so as to maximise expected utility. 
28 My thanks to Prof. Thaddeus Metz and this journal’s anonymous reviewer for helping me to see this point. In the 
original presentation of this paper, I argued that Utilitarianism, like Divine Command Theory, fails to constitute a 
combination case. My original argument was as follows. Utilitarianism is the fl agship agent-neutral metaethic – 
where this is agentneutrality in the independence sense (as above). Then, I argued that, in order for Utilitarianism to 
cope with the Papua New Guinea case, Utilitarianism must adopt a ‘probability constraint’ according to which an 
agent S has a reason to Φ when: (1) Φing maximises utility, and (2) the ‘probability constraint’ is met: it is reasonably 
likely that S’s Φing will maximise utility. However, if Utilitarianism adopts this probability constraint (which it must, 
I argued, in order to cope with the Papua New Guinea case), then it in fact doesn’t constitute a combination case, since 
the addition of criterion (2) transforms this metaethic from an independently agent-neutral one to a dependently agent-
relative one, since the normative force on this probability-constraint version derives from the agent’s being in the most 
likely position to maximize utility – that is, a feature of the agent, which is dependence agent-relativity and not the 
requisite independence agentneutrality. Prof. Metz has helped me to see that what I called the probability constraint 
may actually be built into the ‘expected’ qualification of the Utilitarian principle, and my argument has since changed 
accordingly. 
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(specifically, the maximisation thereof) as independently agent-neutral, and that the 
Utilitarian qualification to ‘maximise expected utility’ entails heterogeneous agent-
relativity. Generous readers may, furthermore, be willing to concede that Conditional 
Realism constitutes a third combination case, according to which reasons are 
independently agent-neutral, real and sui generis, yet simultaneously heterogeneously 
agent-relative, given their conditional form. Each of the combination cases 
demonstrates, contra the reduction objection, that the hetero-/ homogeneous sense 
isn’t simply a derivative of the dependence/independence sense. Given that there are (at 
least) two senses of the traditional ‘agent-relative’/‘agent-neutral’ vocabulary at large in 
the literature, each future use of those terms ought to be stipulated as being used in 
either the dependence/independence or the hetero-/homogeneous sense, or the 
traditional terminology ought to be abandoned entirely, in favour of new terminology less 
likely to lead to confusion. 
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